

U.S. Plans New Way to Check Soviet Missile Tests

By RICHARD BURT

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WASHINGTON, June 29.—The Carter Administration, concerned that Turkey might not allow U-2 reconnaissance planes over its territory, is preparing an alternative plan for verifying the new strategic arms treaty with Moscow, officials here said today.

The plan, they said, calls for several improvements to existing methods for monitoring Soviet missile tests, including the upgrading of an electronic listening post in Norway and the use of a satellite that is now programmed to collect other information.

Although the officials acknowledged that the use of specially designed U-2 planes flying over Turkey offered the best substitute for listening stations lost in Iran early this year, they asserted that the alternative improvements to other intelligence systems would enable the Administration to insure that Moscow did not exceed restrictions on missile modernization contained in the arms treaty.

A New Satellite by 1983

They said that as early as 1983, the United States would possess a new satellite that could monitor almost all the missile test data formerly obtained by the monitoring sites in Iran.

State Department officials pointed to a statement yesterday by the Turkish Foreign Ministry indicating that the U-2 might still be permitted to fly over the country. Although a ranking Turkish Army officer said earlier this week that the flights could not be permitted "under

present circumstances," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said the Government had not reached a final decision.

Despite this, critics of the arms accord on Capitol Hill maintained that, with or without the surveillance flights, the United States could not verify restrictions against increases in size and payload of existing missiles.

Big Soviet Explosion Detected

The verification controversy heated up this week with reports that the Soviet Union conducted an underground nuclear test last Saturday that might have exceeded limits laid down in an accord Moscow signed in 1974 with Washington.

The accord put a ceiling of 150 kilotonnes on the size of such nuclear explosions. Some American experts believe that the latest Soviet test might have been twice that size. One kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT.

Although it is unclear whether the Soviet test exceeded the 150 kiloton limit, officials said the Administration has asked Moscow to explain the possible infraction.

Meanwhile, officials said that plans were under way at the Central Intelligence Agency and in the Pentagon to collect missile test data previously obtained by the stations in Iran by using a satellite, code-named Chalet, and a large radio intercept antenna in Norway.

Signals Can Be Intercepted

They said both the satellite and the ground station in Norway could be adjusted to pick up some of the radio signals broadcast by Soviet missiles

during flight tests. The listening posts provide data on missile performance characteristics and experts considered vital to verifying the treaty provisions concerning modernization of warheads.

Earlier, officials said, the possibility of building a monitoring station in Pakistan similar to those lost in Iran, had been considered by the Administration. The proposal was turned down after informal contacts with Pakistani authorities indicated that it would not be accepted.

A proposal for using high-altitude rockets launched from ships in the Indian Ocean to monitor missile test signals was also dismissed as technically unfeasible, they said.

Critics See Holes in Detection

Congressional critics of the proposal to rely on the Norwegian station and satellite for verification contended that these systems would only be able to pick up a small fraction of the missile telemetry obtained previously at the Iranian sites. They said that a majority function of the Iran stations had been to collect missile data transmitted during the first 60 seconds of a test launch and that this data could not be collected from Norway or from existing systems in space.

Pentagon officials said that for Moscow to build a new missile under test, it would have to shield 20 or 30 test launches from American surveillance systems for more than a year. They concluded that modest improvements to existing surveillance capabilities ruled out the possibility of a large-scale cover program of this sort.

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